Related provisions for SYSC 19A.3.31

1 - 20 of 49 items.
Results filter

Search Term(s)

Filter by Modules

Filter by Documents

Filter by Keywords

Effective Period

Similar To

To access the FCA Handbook Archive choose a date between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 2004 (From field only).

SYSC 19D.3.3RRP
(1) This section applies in relation to dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff, except as set out in (3).(2) When establishing and applying the total remuneration policies for dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff, a firm must comply with this section in a way2 that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities (the dual-regulated firms remuneration principles proportionality rule).(3) Paragraphs (1)
SYSC 19D.3.22GRP
The FCA would normally expect it to be appropriate for the ban on paying variable remuneration to members of the management body of a firm that benefits from exceptional government intervention to apply only to members of the management body who were in office at the time that the intervention was required.
SYSC 19D.3.24GRP
(1) This Remuneration Principle stresses the importance of risk adjustment in measuring performance, and the importance within that process of applying judgment and common sense. The FCA expects that a firm will apply qualitative judgements and common sense in the final decision about the performance-related components of variable remuneration pools. (2) [deleted]1(3) We consider good practice in this area to be represented by those firms who provide a quantitative reference or
SYSC 19D.3.33GRP
In the FCA’s view, circumstances in which a person will be using a personal hedging strategy include (and are not limited to) entering into an arrangement with a third party under which the third party will make payments, directly or indirectly, to that person that are linked to or commensurate with the amounts by which the person's remuneration is subject to reductions.
SYSC 19D.3.46GRP
(1) Guaranteed variable remuneration should be subject to the same requirements applicable to variable remuneration awarded by the firm including deferral, malus and clawback.(2) The FCA expects that guaranteed variable awards and retention awards should not be common practice for dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff and should be limited to rare, infrequent occurrences. The FCA expects a firm to provide prior notification to the FCA of any proposed retention1 awards.
SYSC 19D.3.60GRP
(1) Deferred remuneration paid in:(a) shares or share-linked instruments should be made under a scheme which meets appropriate criteria, including risk adjustment of the performance measure used to determine the initial allocation of shares;(b) cash should also be subject to performance criteria.(2) The FCA would generally expect a firm to have a firm-wide policy (and group-wide policy, where appropriate) on deferral. The proportion deferred should generally rise with the ratio
SYSC 19D.3.65GRP
The governing body (or, where appropriate, the remuneration committee) should approve performance adjustment policies, including the triggers under which adjustment would take place. The FCA may ask firms to provide a copy of their policies and expects firms to make adequate records of material decisions to operate the adjustments.
SYSC 19D.3.68GRP
(1) Sections 137H and 137I of the Act enable the FCA to make rules that render void any provision of an agreement that contravenes specified prohibitions in the dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code, and that provide for the recovery of any payment made, or other property transferred, in pursuance of such a provision.(2) SYSC 19D.3.66R and SYSC 19D.3.67R (together with SYSC 19D Annex 1) are:(a) rules referred to in (1) that render void provisions of an agreement that contravene
SYSC 19A.3.3RRP
(1) This section applies in relation to Remuneration Code staff, except as set out in (3).(2) When establishing and applying the total remuneration policies for Remuneration Code staff, a firm must comply with this section in a way and to the extent that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities (the remuneration principles proportionality rule).(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to the requirement for
SYSC 19A.3.21GRP
The FCA6 would normally expect it to be appropriate for the ban on paying variable remuneration to 3members of the management body of a firm that benefits from exceptional government intervention to apply only in relation to 3members of the management body who were in office at the time that the intervention was required.33
SYSC 19A.3.34GRP
(1) Taking account of the remuneration principles proportionality rule, the appropriate regulator8 does not generally consider it necessary for a firm to apply the rules referred to in (2) where, in relation to an individual ("X"), both the following conditions are satisfied:8(a) Condition 1 is that Xs variable remuneration is no more than 33% of total remuneration; and(b) Condition 2 is that Xs total remuneration is no more than 500,000.(2) The rules referred to in (1) are those
SYSC 19A.3.50GRP
(1) Deferred remuneration paid in:6(a) shares or share-linked instruments should be made under a scheme which meets appropriate criteria, including risk adjustment of the performance measure used to determine the initial allocation of shares; and6(b) cash should also be subject to performance criteria.6(2) The FCA6 would generally expect a firm to have a firm-wide policy (and group-wide policy, where appropriate) on deferral. The proportion deferred should generally rise with
SYSC 19A.3.53GRP
(1) [deleted]6(2) The governing body (or, where appropriate, the remuneration committee) should approve performance adjustment policies, including the triggers under which adjustment would take place. The FCA6 may ask firms to provide a copy of their policies and expects firms to make adequate records of material decisions to operate the adjustments.
SYSC 19A.3.55GRP
(1) Sections 137H and 137I of the Act enables the FCA6 to make rules that render void any provision of an agreement that contravenes specified prohibitions in the Remuneration Code, and that provide for the recovery of any payment made, or other property transferred, in pursuance of such a provision. SYSC 19A.3.53A R and1SYSC 19A.3.54 R (together with SYSC 19A Annex 1) are such rules1 and render1 void provisions of an agreement that contravene the specified prohibitions on guaranteed
SYSC 19C.3.3RRP
(1) This section applies to BIPRU Remuneration Code staff, except as set out in (3).(2) When establishing and applying the total remuneration policies for BIPRU Remuneration Code staff, a firm must comply with this section in a way and to the extent that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of its activities (the BIPRU remuneration principles proportionality rule).(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to the requirement for significant
SYSC 19C.3.6GRP
  1. (1)

    In the FCA's view:

    1. (a)

      a firm's staff includes its employees;

    2. (b)

      a person who performs a significant influence function for, or is a senior manager of, a firm would normally be expected to be part of the firm'sBIPRU Remuneration Code staff;

    3. (c)

      the table in (2) provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of key positions that should, subject to (d), be within a firm's definition of staff who are risk takers;

    4. (d)

      firms should consider how the examples in the table in (2) apply to their own organisational structure;

      1
    5. (e)

      firms may find it useful to set their own metrics to identify their risk takers based, for example, on trading limits; and

    6. (f)

      a firm should treat a person as being BIPRU Remuneration Code staff in relation to remuneration in respect of a given performance year if they were BIPRU Remuneration Code staff for any part of that year.

    [Note: The FCA has published guidance on the application of particular rules on remuneration structures in relation to individuals who are BIPRU Remuneration Code staff for only part of a given performance year. This guidance is available at www.fca.org.uk/firms/remuneration

    .]

  2. (2)

    High-level category

    Suggested business lines

    Heads of significant business lines (including regional heads) and any individuals or groups within their control who have a material impact on the firm's risk profile

    Fixed income

    Foreign exchange

    Commodities

    Securitisation

    Sales areas

    Investment banking (including mergers and acquisitions advisory)

    Commercial banking

    Equities

    Structured finance

    Lending quality

    Trading areas

    Research

    Heads of support and control functions and other individuals within their control who have a material impact on the firm's risk profile

    Credit/market/operational risk

    Legal

    Treasury controls

    Human resources

    Compliance

    Internal audit

SYSC 19C.3.17GRP
(1) This Remuneration Principle is designed to manage the conflicts of interest which might arise if other business areas had undue influence over the remuneration of employees within control functions. Conflicts of interest can easily arise when employees are involved in the determination of remuneration for their own business area. Where these do arise they need to be managed by having in place independent roles for control functions (including, notably, risk management and
SYSC 19C.3.21GRP
The FCA would normally expect it to be appropriate for the ban on paying variable remuneration to senior personnel of a firm that benefits from exceptional government intervention to apply only in relation to senior personnel who were in office at the time that the intervention was required.
SYSC 19C.3.34GRP
(1) Taking account of the BIPRU remuneration principles proportionality rule, the FCA does not generally consider it necessary for a firm to apply the rules in (2) where, in relation to an individual ("X"), both the following conditions are satisfied: (a) condition 1 requires that X’s variable remuneration is no more than 33% of total remuneration; and(b) condition 2 requires that X’s total remuneration is no more than 500,000.(2) The rules referred to in (1) relate to: (a) guaranteed
SYSC 19C.3.43GRP
Variable remuneration can be awarded to BIPRU Remuneration Code staff in the form of retention awards where it is compatible with the BIPRU Remuneration Code general requirement to do so. The FCA considers this is likely to be the case only where a firm is undergoing a major restructuring and a good case can be made for retention of particular key staff members on prudential grounds. Proposals to give retention awards should form part of any notice of the restructuring proposals
SYSC 19C.3.50GRP
(1) Deferred remuneration paid in shares or share-linked instruments should be made under a scheme which meets appropriate criteria, including risk adjustment of the performance measure used to determine the initial allocation of shares. Deferred remuneration paid in cash should also be subject to performance criteria.(2) The FCA generally expects a firm to have a firm-wide policy (and group-wide policy, where appropriate) on deferral. The proportion deferred should generally
SYSC 19C.3.53GRP
(1) Variable remuneration may be justified, for example, to incentivise employees involved in new business ventures which could be loss-making in their early stages. (2) The governing body (or, where appropriate, the remuneration committee) should approve performance adjustment policies, including the triggers under which adjustment would take place. The FCA may ask firms to provide a copy of their policies and expects firms to make adequate records of material decisions to operate
SYSC 19E.2.17GRP
(1) Taking account of the remuneration principles proportionality rule in SYSC 19E.2.4R, the FCA does not generally consider it necessary for a management company to apply the rules referred to in (2) where, in relation to an individual (“X”), both the following conditions are satisfied: (a) Condition 1 is that X’s variable remuneration is no more than 33% of total remuneration; and (b) Condition 2 is that X’s total remuneration is no more than £500,000. (2) The rules to which
PERG 5.4.3GRP
(1) As regards PERG 5.4.2G(1), the Business Order does not provide a definition of ‘remuneration’, however ‘remuneration’ is defined in the IDD. Article 2(1)(9) of the IDD defines ‘remuneration’ to mean any commission, fee, charge or other payment, including an economic benefit of any kind or any other financial or non-financial advantage or incentive offered or given in respect of insurance distribution activities.1(2) In the FCA’s view, ‘remuneration’ in the Business Order follows
PERG 5.4.4GRP
As regards PERG 5.4.2G (2), in the FCA's view, for a person to take up or pursue insurance distribution activity by way of business, the person1 will usually need to be carrying on those activities with a degree of regularity. The person will also usually need to be carrying on the activities for commercial purposes. That is to say, the person1 will normally be expecting to gain a direct financial benefit of some kind. Activities carried on out of friendship or for altruistic
PERG 5.4.7GRP
PERG 5.4.8 G contains a table that summarises the main issues surrounding the business test as applied to insurance distribution activities1 and that may assist persons to determine whether they will need authorisation or exemption. The approach taken in the table involves identifying factors that, in the FCA's view, are likely to play a part in the analysis. Indicators are then given as to the significance of each factor to the person's circumstances. By analysing the indicators
SYSC 19B.1.13AGRP
(1) 2Taking account of the remuneration principles proportionality rule in SYSC 19B.1.4 R, the FCA does not generally consider it necessary for a firm to apply the rules referred to in (2) where, in relation to an individual ("X"), both of the following conditions are satisfied:(a) Condition 1 is that X’s variable remuneration is no more than 33% of total remuneration; and(b) Condition 2 is that X’s total remuneration is no more than £500,000.(2) The rules referred to in (1) are
PERG 4.10A.15GRP
In the FCA's view, credit intermediation under the MCD covers the same activities as the regulated activity of arranging (bringing about) regulated mortgage contracts, except that: (1) credit intermediation only applies if the intermediary acts for remuneration; and(2) the MCD does not cover the regulated mortgage contracts listed in PERG 4.10A.5 G; and(3) the MCD only applies to services provided to consumers;(4) if the intermediary only acts for the creditor, the MCD intermediation
SUP 16.17.1GRP
1The purpose of this section is to ensure that the FCA4 receives regular and comprehensive information about remuneration in a standard format to assist it to benchmark remuneration trends and practices and to collect remuneration information on high earners. It also takes account of the Capital Requirements Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/3115) together with the European Banking Authority's Guidelines to article 75(1) and (3) of the CRD4.1044
SUP 16.17.3RRP
(1) 4A firm to which this rule applies must submit a Remuneration Benchmarking Information Report to the FCA annually.(2) The firm must complete the Remuneration Benchmarking Information Report in the format set out in SUP 16 Annex 33A.(3) The firm must submit the Remuneration Benchmarking Information Report to the FCA within four months of the firm'saccounting reference date.(4) A firm that:(a) is not part of a UK lead regulated group must complete that report on an unconsolidated
SUP 16.17.4RRP
(1) A firm to which this rule applies must submit a High Earners Report to the FCA4 annually.104(2) The firm must submit that report to the FCA4 within four months of the end of the firm'saccounting reference date.104(3) A firm that is not part of a UK lead regulated group must complete that report on an unconsolidated basis in respect of remuneration awarded in the last completed financial year to all high earners of the firm who mainly undertook their professional activities
SYSC 19C.1.7GRP
(1) The BIPRU Remuneration Code does not contain specific notification requirements. However, general circumstances in which the FCA expects to be notified by firms of matters relating to their compliance with requirements under the regulatory system are set out in SUP 15.3 (General notification requirements). (2) In particular, in relation to remuneration matters, such circumstances should take into account unregulated activities as well as regulated activities and the activities
SYSC 19C.1.8GRP
The FCA's policy on individual guidance is set out in SUP 9. Firms should particularly note the policy on what the FCA considers to be a reasonable request for guidance (see SUP 9.2.5 G). For example, where a firm is seeking guidance on a proposed remuneration structure, the FCA will expect the firm to provide a detailed analysis of how the structure complies with the BIPRU Remuneration Code, including the general requirement for remuneration policies, procedures and practices
SYSC 21.1.2GRP
(1) A Chief Risk Officer should:(a) be accountable to the firm'sgoverning body for oversight of firm-wide risk management;(b) be fully independent of a firm's individual business units;(c) have sufficient authority, stature and resources for the effective execution of his responsibilities; (d) have unfettered access to any parts of the firm's business capable of having an impact on the firm's risk profile; (e) ensure that the data used by the firm to assess its risks are fit for
SYSC 21.1.5GRP
(1) The FCA9 considers that, while the firm'sgoverning body is ultimately responsible for risk governance throughout the business, firms should consider establishing a governing body risk committee to provide focused support and advice on risk governance.(2) Where a firm has established a governing body risk committee, its responsibilities will typically include:(a) providing advice to the firm'sgoverning body on risk strategy, including the oversight of current risk exposures
SYSC 19C.2.2GRP
(1) If a firm'sremuneration policy is not aligned with effective risk management, it is likely that employees will have incentives to act in ways that might undermine effective risk management. (2) The BIPRU Remuneration Code covers all aspects of remuneration that could have a bearing on effective risk management including salaries, bonuses, long-term incentive plans, options, hiring bonuses, severance packages and pension arrangements. In applying the BIPRU Remuneration Code,
SYSC 19C.2.3GRP
(1) The specific remuneration requirements in this chapter may apply only to certain categories of employee. However, the FCA expects firms, in complying with the BIPRU Remuneration Codegeneral requirement, to apply certain principles on a firm-wide basis.(2) In particular, the FCA considers that firms should apply the principle relating to guaranteed variable remuneration on a firm-wide basis (Remuneration Principle 12(c); SYSC 19C.3.40 R to SYSC 19C.3.43 G. (3) The FCA also
PERG 5.11.6GRP
(1) The5 exclusion for groups and joint enterprises in article 69 of the Regulated Activities Order (Groups and joint enterprises) does not apply to transactions relating to contracts of insurance. This will affect5 a company providing services for:(a) other members of its group; or(b) other participants in a joint enterprise of which it is a participant.(2) Such companies might typically provide risk or treasury management or administration services which may include regulated
SYSC 19D.1.7GRP
(1) In addition to the notification requirements in the dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code2, general circumstances in which the FCA expects to be notified by firms of matters relating to their compliance with requirements under the regulatory system are set out in SUP 15.3 (General notification requirements).(2) For remuneration matters in particular, those circumstances should take into account unregulated activities, as well as regulated activities and the activities of
SYSC 19D.1.8GRP
The FCA's policy on individual guidance is set out in SUP 9. Firms should particularly note the policy on what the FCA considers to be a reasonable request for guidance (see SUP 9.2.5G). For example, where a firm is seeking guidance on a proposed remuneration structure, the FCA will expect the firm to provide a detailed analysis of how the structure complies with the dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code, including the general requirement for remuneration policies, procedures